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Non-Governmental Organizations as Specialized
Intermediaries in Global Environmental Protection
TAKAO Katsuki※
This paper looks at changing roles of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
in the context of global environmental 
protection. The innovative nature of 
NGOs in this context is analyzed in view 
of the concept of “specialized intermedi-
ary”. Three elements of their activities, 
namely connecting the opinions of global 
citizens and international negotiations, 
organizing local environmental projects, 
and connecting emissions reducers and 
offset buyers through the market, are 
identiﬁed as new and signiﬁcant contri-
butions in global environmental context.
1. Specialized intermediary
The term “non-governmental organiza-
tion (NGO)” refers to a wide variety of 
“voluntary group of individuals or orga-
nizations, formed to provide services or 
to advocate a public policy” (Encyclope-
dia Britannica). The expression “non-gov-
ernmental” was first invented and de-
fined by the United Nations Charter in 
1945 to distinguish from governmental 
and inter-governmental organizations or 
private companies. 
Although a number of NGOs, such as the 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 
already existed in the 19th century, it is 
since World War II, and more notably 
since the 1970s, that international NGOs 
have grown in number and scale. They 
address such a variety of issues as hu-
man rights, development assistance, pro-
vision of medicine, disaster relief, and 
protection of the environment. 
Most NGOs are run by private donations 
from individuals, but many are also sup-
ported by governmental organizations. 
Big NGOs, such as Greenpeace and the 
Sierra Club, are managed internationally 
based on massive donation at an interna-
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tional scale, while others, such as the 
National Trust, are transnational federa-
tions of national groups managed nation-
ally. 
Environmental protection is an area 
where NGOsʼ activities have signiﬁcant 
repercussions. Some NGOs, such as 
Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) and 
Greenpeace, have developed the finan-
cial basis to support substantial and in-
ﬂuential projects, and sufﬁcient techni-
cal basis to support global networks of 
information and expertise. To this end, 
these big NGOs (BiNGOs) have become 
equivalent to or even bigger players than 
intergovernmental organizations from 
both financial and information view-
points, as seen in Figure 1.
Those NGOs have their own unique ap-
proaches and activities in environmental 
protection: undertaking conservation 
programs alone or together with govern-
ments and local communities, collection 
and dissemination of information/exper-
tise, and even such agreements as debt-
for-nature swap with heavily indebted 
poor countries. Recent activities of 
NGOs extend to such new areas as mar-
ket-based programs and carbon funds, 
and include a deepening involvement in 
the management of big private compa-
nies. A salient feature of these emerging 
types of activities is multi-faceted inter-
mediation between stakeholders, poten-
Figure 1 Comparison of annual budgets of selected international 
NGOs and UN agency
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tial demands from the market and other 
unemployed resources in society.
The concept of “specialized intermedi-
ary” was coined by Khanna and Palepu 
(1999) to explain the unique innovative 
potential of modern free markets. Their 
main question was on the rise and fall of 
conglomerates, namely, why they be-
came outdated as markets become more 
efﬁcient in advanced economies.
A century ago conglomerates dominated 
the economy in the United States with 
the biggest companies all being conglom-
erates, such as Morgan and Rockefeller, 
often established by “robber barons”. The 
same applies to Japan in which a few 
conglomerates, or “Zaibatsu”, were so 
dominant until the end of World War II 
that the economy was described as a 
“two-layered” structure, where the Zai-
batsu could be distinguished from the 
rest of the economy. 
Yet these conglomerates have become 
much less visible after the 1970s, with 
more focused and specialized companies 
becoming plentiful and dominant in most 
developed markets. Today, the value of 
conglomerates often has a lower market 
value than the sum of diversiﬁed opera-
tions, and stock markets may apply a 
“conglomerate discount” to their shares. 
Khanna and Palepu (op. cit.) explain that 
this is largely because markets have be-
come more efﬁcient than a century ago. 
Capital markets are better at allocating 
resources among different businesses 
than chief executives. Their point of ar-
gument is that the efﬁciency arises from 
the presence of specialized intermediar-
ies. A specialized intermediary is a per-
son, company or organization that links 
resources (person, money, knowledge, 
inventions, etc.) to their potential uses/
users (entrepreneurs, companies, inves-
tors, etc.) with their specialized skills, 
accumulated knowledge and educated 
vision.
In the markets for capital, for example, 
specialized intermediaries include mutu-
al funds, venture capitalists, equity ana-
lysts, auditors, and so forth. In the mar-
kets for labor, they may encompass exec-
utive-search ﬁrms, vocational and busi-
ness schools, and certiﬁcation agencies 
to recognize professional skills. In the 
markets for products and ideas, they may 
be intellectual-property lawyers and con-
sumer activists. 
The function of a specialized intermedi-
ary may be seen as a proxy to that of ca-
talysis in a chemical reaction. In some 
chemical reactions, addition of a sub-
stance not consumed during the reaction 
may drastically accelerate the rate of re-
action. Such a substance is called cata-
lyst, and a biological catalyst is often 
called an enzyme. In a catalyzed reac-
tion, the catalyst generally enters into 
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chemical reaction either by helping con-
tacts of reactants or by by-passing obsta-
cles to the reaction (Figure 2). They are 
usually not consumed in the reactions 
themselves, so that they can be repeat-
edly used. 
Specialized intermediaries in modern 
markets are similar to the catalyst in 
chemical processes. Specialized interme-
diaries bring together those who have a 
speciﬁc capacity (person, money, knowl-
edge, inventions, etc.) and those who 
need such capacity, and urge the latter to 
achieve their own goals, thereby fulﬁll-
ing their potential, which, without the 
catalyst would otherwise be hard to real-
ize. Specialized intermediaries, such as 
brokers, consultants, market analysts, 
professional instructors, specialized law-
yers and others, can repeatedly mediate 
such marriages among different business 
partners and stakeholders.
A possible objection to the explanation 
about the fall of conglomerates with the 
concept of specialized intermediaries 
may arise from the fact that conglomer-
ates are thriving in many emerging econ-
omies even after the wave of globaliza-
tion. In Korea, for example, 80% of the 
largest 50 companies by revenue were 
conglomerates or “chaebol”, and their 
revenues grew on average by 11 % a year 
over the past decade. (The Economist, 
January 11th, 2014) In India, they share 90 
% of the top 50 companies and the 
growth was 23 % a year (Ibid.). 
To verify these points, Khanna and 
Palepu (op. cit.) investigated conglomer-
ates of India and Brazil as samples of 
emerging economies, and found that con-
glomerates in the two economies have 
acted as their own intermediaries. 
In those countries, conglomerates can 
use their brand value in absorbing the 
best and brightest from the younger peo-
ple by assuring stability and prestige in 
Figure 2 A  model of the function of a specialized intermediary
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their careers, give them expert training 
in different specialized areas, and man-
age those expertise among different sub-
sidiaries by transferring them from one 
business to another. In the same token, 
conglomerates can make full use of their 
brand value for business assurance and 
continuity in societies with poor legal in-
frastructure. In short, conglomerates in 
emerging economies are exploiting the 
underdeveloped markets by ﬁlling their 
“institutional void”.
However, such advantages of conglomer-
ates may not last forever, as they did in 
the United States and Japan. Internal 
capital markets may turn into hidden 
cross-subsidies, internal human re-
source pools into cronyism and corrup-
tion, and complexity becomes synony-
mous with opacity that hinders transpar-
ency at which investors in the global 
market take a close look.
This concept of specialized intermediary 
may be useful to explain the innovative 
nature of recent NGOsʼ functioning in en-
vironmental protection and policy. In the 
following section, we will look at func-
tions of NGOs from three aspects.
2. Linking public opinion and 
diplomacy
Diplomatic negotiations, either bilateral 
or multilateral, are often considered as 
one of the least democratic among all the 
political processes. Diplomatic delegates 
are usually not chosen through demo-
cratic elections but picked up either from 
professional diplomats or bureaucrats 
from concerned administrative depart-
ments. Substantial parts of negotiations 
among those delegates are often hidden 
behind closed doors, while official de-
bates and dialogues stay largely formal 
and ceremonial (details are discussed in 
Takao, 2014). On the other hand, the 
voice of citizens is seldom heard or re-
ﬂected in such ofﬁcial or unofﬁcial nego-
tiations. 
If any such voice of the citizenry was to 
possibly reach those venues of negotia-
tion, it is via the activities of NGOs. It 
has become quite usual that many inter-
national conferences are targeted by ac-
tion-oriented NGOs, which often sur-
round these venues with massive demon-
strations, loudly appealing their slogans, 
or even attempting eye-catching perfor-
mances. But other NGOs act more gently, 
by disseminating their policy proposals, 
contacting key delegates and trying to 
persuade them. 
One of the most notable success of such 
quiet effort is the case of the movement 
of the International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines (ICBL), which resulted in 
adoption of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
Treaty (Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on 
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their Destruction, or simply, the Ottawa 
Treaty). 
In October 1992, ICBL was founded by 
peace-activist Jody Williams with an in-
ternational coalition of more than 1,400 
NGOs from more than 70 countries, in-
cluding the Human Rights Watch and 
Vietnam Veterans of America Founda-
tion. Its campaign urged the internation-
al community to entirely ban anti-per-
sonnel land mines and increased funding 
for mine clearance and victim assis-
tance. 
The campaign won assistance from the 
Canadian government, which hosted the 
negotiation of the convention until the 
adoption of the Treaty, which is now 
known as the Ottawa Process. The pro-
cess yielded an unusually cohesive part-
nership between NGOs, the United Na-
tions, international organizations and 
governments (Short, 1999). The Ottawa 
Treaty was ﬁnally adopted by 122 coun-
tries in Ottawa in December 1997. 
Following the implementation of the 
treaty and the launch of landmines erad-
ication programs, the number of people 
(mostly civilians) maimed or killed by 
antipersonnel land mines was soon re-
duced from about 18,000 to roughly 5,000 
per year. Trade in land mines had virtu-
ally disappeared, more than 40 million 
stockpiled mines had been destroyed, 
and the number of mine-producing states 
had dropped from 54 to 13 (Encyclope-
dia Britannica, op. cit.).
The role of ICBL may be characterized 
by both that of advocacy that brings an 
issue to the attention of the general pub-
lic and that of policy formulation that 
proposes a speciﬁc policy to address the 
issue and urges the decision-makers to 
move toward its adoption. Such dual 
roles of NGOs may also be observed in 
global campaigns against slavery, the 
trade in ivory, violence against women, 
apartheid in South Africa and the prolif-
eration of nuclear weapons.
A significant track that may empower 
NGOs to pursue such policy-related roles 
is through the involvement in the United 
Nations conferences and meetings. Arti-
cle 71 of the UN Charter authorized the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
to grant consultative status to NGOs. As 
of 2012, there are 148 organizations in 
general consultative status, 2,608 in spe-
cial consultative status and 979 on the 
Roster. These NGOs are automatically 
granted the right to participate in confer-
ences, although speciﬁc rules of partici-
pation are considerably different among 
conferences. NGOs occasionally hold 
parallel forums in conjunction with ofﬁ-
cial inter-governmental ones.
An important channel of NGOs to convey 
public opinions to and from the ofﬁcial 
policy processes is through the dissemi-
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nation of their newspapers and newslet-
ters inside and outside of the venues. 
Newsletters, such as the “Earth Summit 
Times” which was issued daily during 
the Rio Earth Summit (U.N. Conference 
on Environment and Development, Rio 
de Janeiro, Brazil, 1992) and its preced-
ing meetings, covers widely the topics of 
the global environmental negotiations, 
like the status-quo of the conference and 
new opinions and proposals. The inter-
net revolution has enabled the spread of 
such news far more quickly and freely to 
the general public, and the same applies 
to the reaction from the public as feed-
back to the negotiation.
In other cases, NGOs may act as sources 
of new policy proposals, encompassing 
new ideas and innovative solutions to 
the issues of the political negotiation. 
For example, during the deliberation of 
the Clean Air Act at the US Congress in 
1989, it was Environmental Defense 
Fund (EDF) that proposed the emissions 
trading system, then a new approach vir-
tually unknown outside the academia, to 
alleviate acid rain, a focal issue that dev-
astated wide areas of north-eastern Unit-
ed States and Canada. The proposal 
quickly attracted attention and support, 
passed the Congress, and became the Ti-
tle IV, commonly known as the Acid Rain 
Program, of the Clean Air Act Amend-
ment of 1990. The Acid Rain Program 
was the first full-scale application of 
emissions trading policy, and had been 
quickly recognized as “one of the most 
successful environmental policies in the 
US” (Ellerman, 2000).
NGOsʼ other policy-related roles also in-
clude provision of technical information 
and expertise to governments and inter-
national organizations on various policy 
issues, often supplying local information 
unavailable to them. Some NGOs contin-
uously monitor the status quo of environ-
mental quality, watch illegal activities at 
a global scale and bring matters to the 
attention of the international communi-
ty, thereby helping it to make appropri-
ate decisions and policies.
In sum, NGOsʼ roles of specialized inter-
mediation in policy negotiation may be 
categorized into four elements, ie., 
• Conveying public voices into ofﬁcial 
negotiation venues
• Disseminating news on the develop-
ment of the global policy negotiation 
to the general public
• Input of new ideas including those 
from the academia to decision-mak-
ers
• Monitoring the global environment 
and destructive activities (watchdog 
function)
3. Linking stakeholders of en-
vironmental projects
NGOs, particularly smaller ones, are fre-
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quently involved in various types of envi-
ronmental projects, including conserva-
tion of particular ecosystems, protection 
of biological diversity, and others. In 
those projects, NGOs may play an initia-
tive role to plan and ﬁnance them, or sec-
ondary roles, say as technical advisors, 
coordinators, teachers and advertisers. 
In addition, NGOsʼ emerging roles in-
clude that of specialized intermediaries, 
bridging the governments, individuals, 
local communities and other stakehold-
ers, and assisting in the planning and 
management of their environmental proj-
ects. Following is an example of man-
grove rehabilitation projects, conducted 
through the cooperation of local and 
central governments, the local communi-
ty, NGOs and others in Central Java, In-
donesia. 
Mangrove is a common ﬂora in tropical 
areas, usually in dense thickets or for-
ests along tidal estuaries, in salt marsh-
es and on muddy coasts. According to 
FAO (2007), Indonesia has the largest 
percentage, 19%, of world mangrove 
area, but the area fell 29% between 2000 
and 2007 to 7.6 million hectares (ha). 
This has been due to the exploitation 
and conversion of mangrove forest into 
other uses, most notably for fish and 
shrimp aquaculture and for manufactur-
ing industries. 
In the coast of Semarang City, mangrove 
forest has also decreased from 325 ha to 
only 15 ha by the end of the 20th century 
(Damanti 2011). Disappearance of man-
grove has resulted in coastal erosion, in-
creased ﬂood risk, and severe deteriora-
tion of water quality.
Efforts of mangrove rehabilitation have 
begun since the mid-1980s by individu-
als, communities, local governments and 
some NGOs. These projects have had 
mixed outcome from environmental, 
economic and social points of view. Fig-
ure 3 illustrates the interactions among 
stakeholders involved in three mangrove 
projects in the study area. Scores shown 
below indicate the result of comprehen-
sive evaluation taking into account their 
economic, socia l and env ironment 
changes to the inhabitants.
The score was the highest for case 1, 
which involves more stakeholders than 
others, while case 3 involves only local 
community and government. A NGO has 
been deeply involved in the case 2, play-
ing a dominant role urging the communi-
ty and government to act, but the score 
was rather mediocre. In contrast, in the 
case 1, a NGO called LEPAAS plays coor-
dinatorʼs role, orchestrating numerous 
stakeholders involved in the project. The 
score was the highest for this case. It 
was found that NGOʼs bridging and coor-
dinating role is more crucial in carrying 
out successful projects to obtain favor-
able economic, social and environmental 
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outcomes.
4. Market-based intermedia-
tion
For long, companies have occasionally 
been under attack from “hostile” NGOs, 
such as Greenpeace and Sea Shepherd 
Conservation Society, on such issues as 
the destruction of rain forests, marine 
mammals or other creatures and ecosys-
tems. However, other NGOs may be rath-
er friendly and have become increasingly 
so. At the other end, an increasing num-
ber of companies ﬁnd it more beneﬁcial 
for them to work with NGOs rather than 
to ﬁght with them. 
MacDonaldʼs and Wal-Mart, for example, 
started to co-operate with Environmen-
tal Defense Fund (EDF) to reduce solid 
wastes from their chains, according to 
the Economist (The Economist Intelli-
gence Unit, 2010). Worldwide Fund for 
Nature (WWF) is also known to work 
with more than 100 companies, including 
IKEA, Coca Cola, and Carrefour, in their 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
programs.
Such partnerships between NGOs and 
for-proﬁt companies often bear favorable 
outcomes to both sides. For NGOs, deep-
er commitment into corporative manage-
ment processes enables NGOs to influ-
Figure 3  Interaction among stakeholders in three mangrove rehabilitation projects
Source: Damanti, 2011.
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ence actual corporate behavior, rather 
than just to speak out environmental slo-
gans. For companies, partnerships may 
reduce the risk of unexpected attacks or 
hostile reactions from both environmen-
tal groups and the public. 
On top of this, a number of NGOs find 
private markets a new ﬁeld that may help 
them pursue their own environmental 
missions. The most notable example is 
the voluntary carbon market, in which a 
number of NGOs, together with other 
types of special intermediaries like mar-
ket analysts, consultants and brokers, 
play the pivotal roles in creating new 
“merchandises” that might convey envi-
ronmental beneﬁt. 
The voluntary carbon market is a market 
in which the reduction of carbon dioxide 
or other greenhouse gases (GHGs) are 
traded. If a private company, individual 
or other organization undertakes a proj-
ect to reduce their emission of GHGs on 
a voluntary basis, i.e., not under govern-
mental regulations, it can bring resulting 
reduction, in tons of CO2 equivalent, to a 
certifying agency. The agency investi-
gates and veriﬁes the reduction, and, if 
the reduction is found real and addition-
al, the agency issues certiﬁcates, called 
offset or credit, which can be traded to 
any companies or individuals. 
There are about a dozen certifying agen-
cies that have voluntary offset programs 
to verify and issue voluntary offsets. 
Each program has its own rules and 
standards in authorizing the reduction 
and managing offsets. 
Certifying agencies are largely classiﬁed 
into three categories; ie., business-, gov-
ernment-, and NGO-based, with the last 
one including non-profit organizations 
(NPOs). Business-based programs are 
those established by private companies 
or their coalition to take opportunity of 
the new market and to seek proﬁt, such 
as the Chicago Climate Change (CCX) 
which maintains its own voluntary trad-
ing scheme. Government-based pro-
grams are those established by govern-
mental or intergovernmental organiza-
tions mostly to support their own volun-
tary emissions trading programs, such 
as the Climate Action Reserve launched 
by the State of California.
Among certifying agencies, NGOs/NPOs 
largely lead the market in terms of trans-
acted volumes and prices, as shown in 
Figure 4. Voluntary Carbon Standard 
(VCS), which was founded by the Inter-
national Emission Trading Association 
and the World Economic Forum, is cur-
rently leading in transacted volume. The 
VCS is followed by the Gold Standard, a 
business-based one established by WWF 
and others, and Chicago Climate Ex-
change, a business-based one.
Since a ton of CO2 has the same effect to 
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the global climate regardless of types 
and locations of emission sources, the 
price of carbon offset should, in theory, 
be identical across any sources. But, as 
shown in Figure 4, prices of voluntary 
carbon offset vary widely, depending on 
types of the project and offset programs. 
The figure indicates that offsets from 
NGO-based programs, such as Carbon 
Fix and the Gold Standard, have consid-
erably higher prices than those from 
business-based ones, such as Chicago 
Climate Exchange. 
An explanation to the higher prices for 
NGO-based programs may be that the 
market seems to reckon them as relative-
ly free from doubts on opaque reduction 
practices and risks associated with so-
cial, environmental and cultural side ef-
Figure 4 Trade volume and price of voluntary car-
bon, by major programs, 2012
(Source: State of Voluntary Carbon Markets 2013)
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fects. Market surveys found that the ma-
jority of end-users of voluntary offsets 
are private companies looking for envi-
ronmental contribution in the context of 
their corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) programs. (The State of the Volun-
tary Carbon Markets 2013) They are in-
terested in not just cheaper prices of off-
sets, but also their quality and value-add-
ed in terms of favorable public images on 
environmental friendliness of the reduc-
tion projects.
In this aspect, NGOs not only offer types 
of offset with favorable public images, 
but also have taken major part in creat-
ing the new offset market from the very 
beginning, in cooperation with other 
specia l ized intermediar ies of ven-
ture-minded brokers and consultants. 
WWF, for example, designed offset pro-
gram called the Gold Standard, which 
laid the market infrastructure, including 
instruments of recording, verifying and 
reporting emissions and of tracking off-
set. 
We may view those activities of NGOs 
and other specialized intermediaries 
both from the “specialized” and “inter-
mediary” aspects (Figure 5). First, spe-
cialized knowledge, particularly those of 
NGOs on emissions reduction in both de-
veloped and developing countries, and in 
variety of types such as improved forest 
management and small hydropower gen-
Figure 5  The role of specialized intermediaries, with NGOs as an example
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eration, played a significant role in de-
signing the new markets. 
Second, NGOs played intermediary func-
tions in combining links between emis-
sions reducers and offset buyers, in such 
situations as helping conser vation 
groups and private companies to ﬁnd po-
tentially proﬁtable projects and guiding 
them into the offset market. 
In this context, NGOsʼ roles of special-
ized intermediation extend to those simi-
lar to the one described in the earlier 
section. NGOs often take advantage of 
their expertise and experience in look-
ing after individuals and local groups 
and connecting them to governmental 
agencies, private companies, public sup-
porters and other potential stakeholders. 
In such projects as REDD+ (Reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation), social aspects of forest 
management are the essential elements 
for which NGOs have unique expertise. 
5. Final remarks
In this short essay, we have discussed 
roles of specialized intermediaries in 
modern markets and viewed activities of 
environmental NGOs from this aspect. 
Three typical roles were found, namely 
in connecting the opinions of global citi-
zens and international negotiations, in 
organizing local environmental projects, 
and in connecting emissions reducers 
and offset buyers through the market.
It may be worth mentioning that special-
ized intermediaries functions of environ-
mental NGOs had been remarkably inno-
vative. The voluntary carbon markets, 
for example, have created new flow of 
money estimated as US$ 523 million in 
2012 (State of the Voluntary Carbon Mar-
kets 2013), which were nonexistent a de-
cade ago. It seems that NGOs have yet 
further possibility to develop their “spe-
cialized” and “intermediary” capacities, 
and to contribute to a better environ-
ment for future generations.
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